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Indian Farmers’ Valuation of Yield Distributions: 
Will poor farmers value ‘pro-poor’ seeds? 
 
ABSTRACT: Potential poverty traps among the rural poor suggest a need to reduce poor 
farmers’ vulnerability by stabilizing crop yields and limiting yield losses. Advances in 
biotechnology will help address this need directly with crops that tolerate climate 
fluctuation or resist biotic stresses. Evaluating ex ante how farmers will value these ‘pro-
poor’ seeds is important for delivery design, but also challenging. This paper describes an 
experimental economic approach to understanding farmers’ valuation of such seeds. Using 
data from a survey and experiment, I assess Indian farmers’ valuation of changes in the 
mean, variance, and skewness of payoff distributions. These farmers value increases in 
expected value, but seem indifferent about higher moment changes in payoff distributions. 
Farmer traits such as wealth and risk exposure affect their valuation of these changes only 
mildly. While various limitations to the experimental approach must qualify practical 
implications of these findings, the experiment demonstrates the viability of conducting 
valuation experiments with open-ended questions in developing countries. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
Uncertainty is a defining feature of poverty (Banerjee 2004). The poor, especially in poor countries, 
lack access to resources and institutions that can reduce routine fluctuations in consumption, income 
or wealth and moderate catastrophic asset or health shocks (see Dercon 2004, Wood 2003, World 
Bank 2000). Studies that find empirical evidence for poverty traps among the rural poor (e.g., 
Barrett, et al. 2001, Carter and May 1999, Dercon 1998, Lybbert, et al. 2004, Zimmerman and Carter 
2003) suggest a need to reduce poor farmers’ vulnerability by stabilizing crop yields and limiting 
yield losses.  
Crop yields are risky because they depend on weather (especially temperature and the 
amount and timing of precipitation), biotic stresses (pests and diseases), and the optimal timing of 
inputs (fertilizers, pesticides and weeding), all of which are stochastic (Roumasset 1976). Advances     
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in agricultural biotechnology have enabled breeders to reduce farmers’ exposure to all three of these 
sources of risk more directly than ever before. Soon, crops that tolerate drought and extreme 
temperatures or resist disease, viruses, bacteria or insects will be available to many farmers. The 
welfare gains for poor farmers who are particularly vulnerable to routine climate fluctuations and 
catastrophic crop losses could be substantial. Of course, realizing these welfare gains requires that 
vulnerable farmers adopt these new seeds. Will the poor farmers who could benefit most choose to 
purchase such risk-reducing seeds?  
Generally, even poor farmers will pay a significant premium for seeds with higher expected 
yield (David and Sperling 1999), but valuing seeds that reduce risk may be particularly challenging. 
The relative benefit of such a seed is a function of the targeted stochastic variable (e.g., weather, 
pests, etc.) and is hence also stochastic. Thus, the advantage of these seeds will not be apparent 
every season, which may slow learning. Many such seeds will be developed and delivered by the 
private sector and may carry a price premium, which has implications for the riskiness of a seed’s net 
returns (Binswanger 1979). For example, farmers paying a premium for pest resistant seeds could 
lose money during low pest load seasons, leading to potentially erratic patterns of adoption and 
disadoption. Such a learning process can be especially painful for poor farmers who are unable to 
survive “a bad year or two in an optimal policy sequence” (Lipton 1968, p. 335). In short, farmers’ 
valuation of seeds that reduce risk will hinge on their risk preferences and on inter-seasonal learning 
in ways quite different from their valuation of other sorts of seeds – ways that make ex ante 
assessment of their valuation challenging as well.  
The objective of this paper is to infer Indian farmers’ valuation of risk-reducing seeds using 
experimental payoff distributions and to explore a field experiment research methodology for 
informing these challenging valuation questions. The experimental approach used elicits farmers risk 
preferences, allows for learning across repeated rounds of the experiment, and directly assesses 
farmers’ valuation of changes in the mean, variance and skewness of a payoff distribution. I     
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conclude that these farmers value increases in expected value arising from unconditional upward 
shifts in the payoff distribution but seem indifferent about higher moment changes. Farmer traits 
such as wealth and risk exposure affect farmers’ valuation of changes in these distributions only 
mildly. While these results relate to farmers’ valuation of risk-reducing ‘pro-poor’ seeds, limitations 
of the experimental methodology must qualify any practical implications. 
After providing a background to pro-poor seeds and farmers’ seed preferences in the next 
section, I present a simple model in section 3 that analytically captures possible pro-poor of risk-
reducing seeds. Later empirical analysis tests the logic of this simple model. In section 4, I describe 
the survey and the experiment conducted with Indian farmers in Tamil Nadu state and present some 
descriptive statistics. Section 5 contains the econometric analysis of data from the survey and 
experiment. Sections 6 and 7, respectively, discuss various limitations of the experimental 
methodology in this case and present conclusions.  
 
2  BACKGROUND 
Presently, seeds that are considered pro-poor confer three types of benefits: (a) higher expected yield 
to address problems such as macro-nutrient deficiency, lack of market entitlements, and chronic 
abiotic stresses such as soil salinity and low soil fertility, (b) higher micro-nutrient content to address 
micro-nutrient deficiency problems, and (c) lower yield risk via better yield stability or lower 
downside yield fluctuation to address problems such as food security and income stability. Poor 
farmers’ valuation of these benefits will affect the uptake of pro-poor seeds, but may be difficult to 
assess in the case of micronutrient or yield risk benefits. This paper discusses an experimental 
approach to assessing farmers’ valuation of the latter. As background, this section highlights the 
logic behind the presumed pro-poor benefits of reducing yield risk, discusses recent examples of 
risk-reducing seeds, and provides an overview of seed preferences and demand among poor farmers.     
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The section closes with a brief overview of the growing body of research in development economics 
that uses experimental methodologies.  
Risk-reducing seeds benefit the poor by reducing vulnerability. Lipton and Longhurst (1989) 
comment on this as they dissect the impact of modern varieties on the poor. Their contrast of the 
goals of plant science and those of poor farmers highlights why higher moments of yield 
distributions should matter to the poor: 
Breeders see quantity (as indicated by yield) – and, some way behind, quality – as 
overwhelmingly their main goals…A poor farmer would still wonder about three missing 
items. They are stability, sustainability, and cross-crop effects. [M]ost breeders may well 
see them as long-term components of yield. Indeed, a lower risk of downward fluctuation 
in crop output, or of its long-run decline, is ultimately a form of increased yield. However, 
poor farmers also value stability as such independently of yield, and even at its expense. 
They cannot afford to take big risks. (Lipton and Longhurst 1989, pp 28-29)  
 
Yield stability may be particularly important to poor farmers in rainfed areas where variable rainfall 
and inherently unstable food production drive poverty dynamics (DeVries and Toenniessen 2001). 
These sensible observations frame yield risk benefits as being distinctly pro-poor. Before assessing 
farmers’ valuation of these benefits, however, it is helpful to capture this logic more formally, which 
will be taken up with the simple model in the next section.  
Recent advances in science have enabled breeders to improve yield stability through 
resistance to biotic or climatic stresses. Since the mid-1980s, yield stability has been an increasingly 
important component of traditional plant breeding (Traxler, et al. 1995). Thanks to biotechnological 
advances, it is now possible to address several stability and micro-nutrient problems, including those 
that were previously intractable (Conway 1997, DeVries and Toenniessen 2001). Resulting gene-
based technologies may also facilitate seed adoption and use, making these benefits more accessible 
to poor farmers. Specific recent examples include mosaic-resistant cassava in Uganda, Mendel 
Biotechnology’s ‘drought protection’ technology, disease-resistant banana, virus- and pest-resistant 
sugar cane, and virus-resistant sweet potato (Wambugu 1999). A more widely familiar example 
involves Bt cotton, which through the Bt gene provides resistance to boring pests and protects     
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farmers from catastrophic crop losses in high pest load years. Although there remains some debate, 
Bt cotton benefits also appear to be distinctly pro-poor (Ismael, et al. 2002, Thirtle, et al. 2003).
1  
Farmers’ seed preferences will ultimately shape adoption patterns of these emerging, risk-
reducing seeds. These preferences are determined largely by farmer traits. Differences in resource 
endowment, management strategy and market situation affect farmers’ valuation of seed production 
traits (yield potential and stability), consumption traits (taste, color, texture), economic traits (early 
maturity, market demand, storability), and cultural traits (beliefs, rituals) (Cromwell, et al. 1992, 
Louwaars, et al. 1997). In many developing countries, farmers range from large-scale commercial to 
small-scale semi-commercial to subsistence (Cromwell, et al. 1992), which translates into complex 
seed preferences in the aggregate. This degree of heterogeneity across farmer types often makes the 
spread of even seemingly-superior seed varieties difficult to predict (David and Sperling 1999).  
More than ever, the seed preferences of poor farmers are manifest in market demand as they 
increasingly procure seeds from the private sector for both cash and subsistence crops (David and 
Sperling 1999, Pray and Fuglie 2000, Tripp and Pal 2000). Seed demand generally tends to be price 
inelastic. Indeed, several other variables affect farmers seed purchase decisions more than price. 
Physical access to an appropriate quantity of quality seeds, the timing of availability, and information 
about seed are often more important than the seed price (Cromwell, et al. 1992, Heisey and Brennan 
1991, Rohrbach and Malusalila 2000, Tripp 2001).  The yield advantage, seed rate, and production 
and market risk of a seed also directly influence farmers’ decision to adopt a new seed (Feder, et al. 
1985).
2  While all this may be true in general, price remains a critical issue for poor farmers. These 
                                                 
1 Although some worry that poor farmers who become dependent on the Bt gene for protection against pests will be 
particularly hurt if (when) pests develop resistance to Bt (Lipton 2001). 
2 Generally, other determinants of technology adoption are equally relevant. Farm characteristics such as size, 
topography and soil quality are important adoption determinants, as are farmer characteristics such as gender 
(Cameron 1999) and education (Pitt and Sumodiningrat 1991), and household wealth and size. Farmers’ perceptions 
about the complexity and relative risk of a technology likewise affect adoption (Adesina and Baidu-Forson 1995, Batz, 
et al. 1999). Information about the value of a new technology is paramount, so learning-by-doing (Cameron 1999), 
learning from others (Foster and Rosenzweig 1995), and – to a lesser extent – formal extension are critical adoption 
determinants. Market imperfections often imply differences in transactions costs (Holloway, et al. 2000), access to     
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vulnerable farmers tend to be more sensitive to seed price than other farmers because they devote a 
larger portion of their less input-intensive production costs to seed purchases. Thus saving seed – a 
viable option for many poor farmers given their opportunity costs and management strategies – 
often provides a cheaper, if inferior, substitute to seeds purchased from dealers (Louwaars, et al. 
1997).  
Since the aim of this paper is partly methodological, this section ends with a brief 
background to experimental techniques as applied to development economics. In the last decade, 
many experimental economists have ventured into the field in pursuit of richer decision-making 
contexts and more varied subject pools. These field experiments in economics are methodologically 
distinct from and complementary to laboratory experiments in several important ways (see 
Carpenter, et al. 2005). Although still nascent, field experiments have been used in development 
economics to measure cooperation, trust, altruism, fairness, and risk and time preferences (see 
Cardenas and Carpenter 2004 for a comprehensive review). Experimental efforts to asses risk 
preferences among poor farmers began with Binswanger (1980), who offered Indian farmers 
dichotomous choices among pairs of gambles and concluded that these farmers were moderately 
risk averse regardless of wealth or other farmer traits, suggesting that farmers’ constraint sets (e.g., 
access to credit and inputs) explain behavioral differences between farmers of differing wealth better 
than risk preferences. Others have investigated risk preferences using dichotomous choice 
experiments more recently with experiments designed to test expected utility theory (Humphrey and 
Verschoor 2004a, Humphrey and Verschoor 2004b). The research in this paper builds on these 
efforts to assess risk preferences with an experiment that uses open-ended questions, which more 
accurately elicit risk preferences and can address a wider range of research questions. 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
credit (Feder, et al. 1985)  and capacity to mitigate and manage risk (Batz, et al. 1999), which can all significantly 
affect the pattern of adoption among different farmers.      
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3  MODEL 
How should farmers value changes in yield distributions? How should a farmer’s wealth affect his 
valuation of these changes? This section presents a stylized, two-season model that analytically 
captures the logic behind the pro-poor benefits of risk-reducing seeds. Econometric analysis in a 
subsequent section tests this logic.  
  Suppose that in the current season farmers receive a net income stream from existing assets 
(wi) and have the option of planting an additional seed variety. To isolate valuation of the yield 
distribution from any scale effects, assume all farmers face the same discrete planting decision: 
whether or not to plant the new seed on a single acre. Assume further that farmers’ wealth in the 
second season is fully determined by first season net income (πi1) according to a commonly known 
recursion function f (πi1). Finally, assume that markets for inputs, output and consumption goods are 
complete and that farmers are price-takers in these markets (i.e., separability) so that maximizing the 
utility of total net income and maximizing the utility of consumption generate the same optimal 
production decisions. The decision whether or not to plant the seed thus involves the problem:  
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and V(.) is the intertemporal utility function, u(.) is a concave and monitonically increasing utility 
function, δ<1 is the discount factor, di=1 if farmer i plants the seed with di=0 otherwise, y(z,ε) is the 
net yield function for the seed measured in per acre monetary units, z is a vector of inputs, ε is 
stochastic yield risk with a probability density function h(ε), and p is the purchase price of the new 
seed. Net yield y(.) is net of all inputs except the seed in order to focus on the seed price, p. To 
isolate the seed purchase decision further, wi captures all other income or transfers net of any 
associated costs. Farmers differ only in wi to emphasize how wealth affects valuation.      
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Assume that the new seed has constant returns to scale and that farmers exhibit no 
systematic technical or allocative inefficiencies. This implies that the optimal input vector per acre 
(z*) is the same for all farmers, as is the optimal stochastic net yield function y=y(ε|z*)=y(ε). With 
this assumption the problem becomes 
   ()( )
{0,1}
max (1 ) , ( ) ( ) , ( ( ) )
i
iiii i i d
dVwfw d E Vy pwfy pw εε
=
⎡ ⎤ − + −+ −+ ⎣ ⎦  
where E is the expectation operator. This discrete planting decision implies a maximum willingness-
to-pay (p*) defined as  
  () ( ) ,() ( ) * ,( ( ) * ) ii i i V w f w E V yp w f yp w εε ⎡⎤ =− + − + ⎣⎦  (1) 
and the decision rule: purchase and plant if and only if p≤p*.  
  As mentioned in the prior section, yield stability and lower downside yield risk are 
presumably pro-poor because many poor farmers subsist precariously close to critical survival 
thresholds. To capture this important rationale for pro-poor seeds that reduce risk, suppose that the 




















Provided that farmers perceive these bifurcated wealth dynamics, the intertemporal utility function 
V(.) is directly shaped by f (.)  as  follows:         


















The discontinuity in this intertemporal utility function implies that farmer i values that portion of 
the net yield distribution below yi
0=π
0+p-wi differently than that above yi
0 since any yield y>yi
0 pushes 
him safely above the trap threshold π
0.      
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The effect of this discontinuity is easy to portray graphically by superimposing the yield risk 
pdf h(ε) on the function V(πi1) as shown in Figure 1.
3 While farmers all face the same yield risk by 
assumption and the shape of the h(ε) pdf is therefore the same for all farmers, the location of this 
distribution is farmer-specific: h(ε) is positioned relative to π
0 according to wi. In Figure 1, h(ε|wi) 
therefore captures both the shape and the horizontal location of the net yield distribution for farmer 
i. A farmer’s valuation of the distribution h(ε|wi) hinges crucially on the tail of h(ε|wi) below π
0, 
denoted as probability θi where  
  
0
00 Pr( ) Pr( ) ( )
i y
ii i i yw yy h w d θ πε ε
−∞
=+ ≤ =≤ = ∫  
Figure 1 clearly shows that farmers’ valuation of a yield distribution should be inversely related to θi. 
Any improvement in yield stability or resistance to catastrophic loss in this model reduces θi and 
helps to push farmers above the trap threshold. While the concavity assumption on u(.) (i.e., risk 
aversion) implies that all farmers value a reduction in θi, the presence of a known trap can 
substantially increase the value of seeds with stabilized or truncated yield distributions – especially 
for poor farmers who subsist near the trap threshold.  
This simple model provides an abstract depiction of the logic behind the pro-poor benefits 
of seeds that reduce downside risk. As captured in the model, farmers benefit from any reduction in 
the lower tail of a yield distribution, but such a reduction disproportionately benefits poor farmers 
for whom a bad harvest can have catastrophic long-run consequences. For many, a series of bad 
harvest draws can quickly make even the kind of draconian subsistence threshold captured in this 
model a relevant threat. All such farmers should warmly welcome ‘pro-poor’ seeds that reduce 
downside risk through stabilized or truncated distributions. I use the data described in the next 
section to test this logic among Indian farmers. 
                                                 
3 Analytical results of the model are available on request. An analytical approach to the model yields the same 
results, albeit less concisely than the graphical approach taken in this paper.      
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4  DATA   
To infer farmers’ valuation of stabilized and truncated crop yield distributions, this paper uses data 
from the Salem and Perambalur districts of Tamil Nadu state, India. This state was selected because 
Tamil Nadu Agricultural University provided administrative and logistical support as a collaborating 
institution in the Agricultural Biotechnology Support Program II, which funded this research. Salem 
and Perambalur districts were selected because these districts constitute Tamil Nadu’s ‘cotton belt.’ 
Some cotton farmers in this area had adopted Bt cotton by 2003 – mostly the MECH 162 and 184 
varieties of Monsanto-MAHYCO’s Bollguard™ cotton – which reduces risk of losses to boring 
pests. Including these farmers in the survey and experiment allows for comparisons between their 
revealed valuation of the Bt gene and their experimental valuation of related changes in payoff 
distributions.
4  
   Ten enumerators on the research team surveyed 290 households in three Perambalur villages 
(Annukur, Pandagapadi, and Namaiyur) and three Salem villages (Vellaiyur, Kilakku Raajapalayam, 
and Kavarparnai). These villages were selected from the 12 or so villages in Tamil Nadu that 
presently have more than 18 Bt cotton farmers. A map of study area is shown in Figure 2. With the 
villages selected, the research team used choice-based stratified sampling to ensure the participation 
of Bt cotton farmers and other farmers. The team constructed a list of all the Bt cotton famers in a 
village and randomly selected Bt cotton farmers, then randomly selected other farmers with the 
assistance of the village administrative officer.  
The research team collected data from selected farmers in two parts. In the first part, 
enumerators administered a detailed household questionnaire focused on farmers’ management 
                                                 
4 In many settings the Bt gene primarily protects against catastrophic loss during heavy pest load seasons thereby 
truncating the lower tail of the yield distribution, but in India the Bt gene seems to protect cotton from catastrophic and 
chronic pest losses and thus may truncate as well as shift the cotton yield distribution (Qaim and Zilberman 2003). 
Since it is impossible to disentangle farmers valuation of a distribution shift from a truncation in this case, assessing     
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decisions, valuation of seed traits, risk exposure and wealth. In the second part, the team conducted 
experiments with farmers to elicit their valuation of hypothetical yield distributions. Farmers earned 
money (Rupees, Rs) according to their performance in the experiment. The first subsection below 
describes the experiment in detail. The second subsection presents descriptive statistics.   
 
Experimental Design: The experiment used for this paper was designed as far as possible according 
to standard experimental economic principles (see Davis and Holt 1993, ch.8). Initial designs were 
refined through field pre-testing with farmers to simplify the structure and presentation of the 
experiment. The primary departure from standard experimental economics involved the degree of 
abstractness. By necessity, the experiment was based clearly in a farming context. This context 
improved farmer comprehension and adds relevance to inferences to crop yield distributions. While 
abandoning some abstractness in favor of context seems defensible in this case, a core challenge in 
designing the experiment was striking an appropriate balance between abstractness and context. This 
challenge is addressed in greater detail in the discussion section below.  
The experiment consisted of a series of hypothetical farming seasons. At the beginning of 
each season, farmers were offered a ‘seed’ with a known Rupee-payoff distribution. This distribution 
was explained simply and repeatedly and shown graphically in order to facilitate farmers’ 
understanding of the payoff distribution implied by a given ‘seed.’ The distribution of a particular 
‘seed’ was represented by 10 chips in a small black bag. There were three colors of chips, each 
representing a ‘harvest’ payoff: blue (high), white (average), and red (low). The distribution was 
modified by changing the proportion of blue, white and red chips in the bag. The contents of the 
bag – the number of chips of each color – were displayed on a large board at the front of the room. 
                                                                                                                                                             
farmers’ valuation of Bt cotton does not further the objective of this paper. Instead, farmers Bt cotton adoption choices 
are taken as a general indication of a farmer’s approach to seed valuation and farm management.      
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The precise format of this display was modified in pre-testing to ensure that farmers understood the 
distribution they were valuing.  
Farmers’ valuation of the seed was elicited using an open-ended question, which generally 
elicits true values better than dichotomous choice questions (Balistreri, et al. 2001, Coursey, et al. 
1999). A well established technique in experimental economics, the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak 
(BDM) mechanism (Becker, et al. 1964), was used to encourage farmers to report their true 
valuation. Following the BDM mechanism, each farmer expressed his maximum WTP for the 
offered seed before the price of the seed was known. The seed price was then randomly drawn from a 
uniform distribution of prices. Only farmers who were willing to pay at least this random seed price 
‘purchased and planted’ the seed. To make the BDM mechanism more tangible for farmers, the lead 
enumerator would explain that the mechanism worked much like sending money with a trusted 
friend to purchase the seed on their behalf without first knowing the seed price. If the friend had 
enough money with him to cover the seed price once he observed the price, he would purchase the 
seed and return any surplus money. If he did not have enough money to cover the seed price, he 
would not purchase the seed and return the money in full. This imagery effectively helped farmers to 
realize that it was always in their best interest to send exactly what the seed was worth to them, 
which is precisely the advantage of the BDM mechanism (Becker, et al. 1964).   
Once the farmers knew whether they had ‘purchased and planted’ the seed and how much 
they paid for it, the lead enumerator would ask a farmer to draw a chip from the bag to determine 
that season’s harvest payoff in ‘game Rupees’ (explained below). Farmers’ net seed earnings for the 
season were computed as the harvest payoff minus the seed price. At the end of each season, all 
farmers – those who ‘purchased and planted’ the seed and those who did not – received 50 game 
Rupees in ‘off-farm earnings’.  
Each seed and its corresponding yield distribution was offered for five consecutive seasons: 
four practice seasons, then one ‘high-stakes’ season. As is common in experimental economics, the     
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difference between a practice season and a ‘high-stakes’ season was the rate at which game Rupees 
were exchanged for real Rupees. All game Rupees earned in practice seasons were exchanged for 
real Rupees at a rate of 1/100 (real Rs./game Rs.). Game Rupees earned in high-stakes seasons were 
exchanged  for real Rupees at a rate of 1/10. This format is popular in many experimental designs 
because it allows for learning, but provides incentives throughout the learning process, and because 
participants see the same payoff numbers (i.e., game Rupees) in practice rounds as they do in high-
stakes rounds, which reduces confusion and allows the researcher to identify the effect of higher-
stakes since this is the only parameter that changes in a high-stakes round (see Irwin, et al. 1998 for 
another example of the use of practice rounds).  
While the design of the experiment aimed to elicit farmers’ valuation as accurately as 
possible, there were two systematic ‘game effects’ that influenced the high-stakes WTP of many 
farmers. First, many farmers who did not purchase the seed in one season would increase their WTP 
in the next season to increase their chances of playing the game.
5 Second, many farmers who played 
the game and had a positive (negative) harvest payoff in one season often increased (cautiously 
lowered) their bids in the following season. In the econometric analysis of the next section, I control 
for these two game effects. 
There were five payoff distributions in the experiment: a Base distribution (B), a High 
distribution (H), a Low distribution (L),
6 a Stabilized distribution (S), and a Truncated distribution 
(T). To control for potential ordering effects, these five distributions were offered to farmers in one 
of four orderings: [B-S-T-H-L-B], [B-L-T-H-S-B], [B-T-L-S-H-B], and [B-H-S-L-T-B]. Since 
farmers’ valuation of distribution changes are desired, these orderings focus attention on changes 
                                                 
5 When questioned about this tendency, most expressed a distinct preference for playing the game over not playing 
the game. Some associated this preference with their proclivities as farmers, explaining that a farmer who fails to 
plant seed in a given season is certain not to succeed. For others, the preference to play was simply due to playing 
being more enjoyable than not playing. Whatever the explanation, it is clearly important to control for this game effect 
before interpreting farmers’ WTP. 
6 To simplify the presentation I exclude the L distribution and focus just on the B, H, S, and T distributions for part of 
the analysis in the paper.     
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relative to the Base distribution, B. Throughout, I use the average of farmers’ high-stakes WTP for 
the first B and the second B to represent WTP for B. These four distributions were preceded by two 
simplified practice distributions to allow farmers to understand the structure of the experiment.  
During the experiment, each enumerator worked separately with at most two farmers. If an 
enumerator was working with two farmers, they would be seated far enough apart that their 
conversations with the enumerator, including any questions about the experiment and the farmers’ 
stated WTP, were completely private. Logistically, the experiment was typically held in a public room 
in the village and would last approximately two hours. The first hour was spent explaining and 
practicing the experiment, then tea was served and farmers could discuss the experiment among 
themselves. The second hour was spent on the B, H, L, S, and T distributions. At the conclusion of 
the experiment, the enumerators asked farmers how well they had understood the experiment, to 
which 11% reported ‘with some confusion,’ 4% reported ‘poorly,’ and 0% reported ‘very poorly.’ 
Enumerators verified this high degree of comprehension through individual and collective 
interaction with the farmers.  
Figure 3 shows the marginal (top panel) and cumulative (bottom panel) probability 
distributions for the B, H, S, and T distributions of the experiment (note that the L distribution that 
is excluded here is B shifted down Rs30). The top panel also shows the Expected Value (EV), 
standard deviation (σ) and skewness (sk) of each distribution. These simple typological distributions 
where chosen to facilitate farmers’ understanding of the experiment. As described above, we used a 
large board with simplified pictures similar to those in Figure 3 (without EV, σ and sk) to explain 
each distribution to farmers. These distributions were also chosen so that key hypotheses about 
farmers valuation of higher moments of yield distributions could be tested. Specifically, these 
distributions represent an increase in EV that leaves σ and skewness unchanged (H), a decrease in σ 
that leaves EV and skewness unchanged (S), and an increase EV due to an increase in skewness that 
leaves σ relatively unchanged (T). From the cumulative probability distributions in the bottom panel     
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of Figure 3, the first-order stochastic dominance (>FSD) properties of these distributions are: 
H>FSDB, T>FSDB, T>FSDS. S weakly second-order stochastic dominates B (S≥SSDB). There is no 
dominance relationship for H, T and H, S. 
 
Descriptive Statistics: Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for several relevant variables from the 
questionnaire and experiment. Of the 290 farmers surveyed, only three (or 1%) are female. One 
third of the farmers have no formal education and the average farmer has five years. 33% (73%) 
own a television (radio), but only 4% own a tractor. Livestock are important for farmers in the 
survey area, and most farmers have at least a couple of animals.
7 The average farmer farms five or 
six acres, about a third of which is irrigated. Cotton and maize are the two most important crops in 
terms of the percentage of farmers’ land planted. Farmers’ top ranking management goal is, not 
surprisingly, increasing yield, after which come protecting against pest losses and lowering 
production costs. Stabilizing yield across years and increasing harvest quality are relatively less 
important to the average farmer.  Finally, farmers’ WTP for B and S appear surprisingly 
indistinguishable for the average farmer, whose WTP is notably higher for T and H. Most farmers 
earned more than Rs60 in the experiment and none earned less than Rs40. Compared to the daily 
wage for unskilled labor in the survey site of about Rs50 the experiment payoffs provided non-trivial 
incentives.  
Since the focus of this paper is farmers’ valuation of changes in payoff distributions, 
additional descriptive statistics on farmers’ bids in the experiment are insightful. One can describe 
these bid data graphically by sorting the bids for each distribution in descending order and then 
graphing these ordered data. Such a graph represents a simple demand curve. Graphs of the ordered 
bid data are shown in Figure 4. The purchase decision in the experiment was discrete, not 
                                                 
7 Tropical Livestock Units are constructed as a weighted sum of cows, bullocks and goats, where the weights are 1, 1 
and 0.1, respectively.     
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continuous, by construction so that farmers either purchased the seed or did not. Thus the 
horizontal axis in Figure 4 is the number of farmers who purchased a particular seed at a given price.  
Consider first the curve for the Base (B) distribution with EVB=Rs50. Ignoring the upper 
and lower tails of the curve, this curve has a shallow slope centered on the Rs45 mean bid (Table 1). 
The demand curve for B is nearly indistinguishable from the demand curve for S. This is surprising 
since EVB=EVS=Rs50 but σS=23.8<40.8=σB. This preliminary evidence suggests that farmers may 
not value lower yield variance. The demand curve for T is uniformly higher than both the S and B 
curves, and the curve for H is uniformly the highest curve. This confirms that farmers are indeed 
responsive to EV changes, but one can infer little more about farmers’ valuation of distribution 
changes from these curves. Consider the difference between the curves of B and T.  While it is clear 
that farmers are willing to pay a premium for T, it is not clear whether this premium is a function of 
all three moment changes – a higher EV, a lower variance and a higher skewness (skT=1>0=skB, 
implying lower downside risk) – or only of a higher EV. To assess how these higher moments affect 
farmers’ valuation, one must move beyond descriptive statistics.  
 
5  ANALYSIS 
In the econometric analysis that follows, I focus on three sets of models. The first set focuses on 
‘treatment’ effects and estimates the mean valuation of the typological distributions of the 
experiment, both independently and relative to distribution B. The second set of models focuses on 
‘moment effects’ and estimates farmers’ valuation of moments of the payoff distributions. The third 
set of models focuses on ‘farmer’ effects and estimates how farmer traits affect farmers’ valuation of 
payoff moments. This third set of models requires wealth and risk exposure indices, which I also 
discuss and estimate in this section.  
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Treatment Effects Models:  The models that isolate the treatment effects are of the form:   
() it it WTP f , ,  ε =+ ti t i tgf  
where WTPit is farmer i’s high-stakes bid or willingness-to-pay for distribution t, tt is a vector of 
treatment dummies with a 1 corresponding to distribution t and 0’s elsewhere, git is a vector of 
‘game effect’ variables that control for the (artificial) effects of specific features of the experiment on 
bidding behavior, fi is a vector of farmer dummies with a 1 corresponding to farmer i that controls 
for farmer fixed effects so that treatment effects are isolated,
8 and εit is an error term distributed 
N(0,σεi
2) where the disturbance variance σεi
2 allows for heteroscedasticity between (but not within) 
farmers.   
I consider three specifications of this generic treatment effects model. The first is: 
12 it B H t S t T t it it it WTP H S T Play Earn α αα α α α ε ′ =+ + + + + + + 1i φ f  
which uses farmers’ absolute WTP as the dependent variable. Independent variables consist of a 
constant, treatment dummies (H, S, T),  two ‘game effects’ variables (Play  and  Earn, explained 
below), and farmer fixed effects (f). The coefficients on the constant and on the treatment dummies 
are the coefficients of primary interest. The coefficient αB indicates the conditional mean WTP for B, 
and (αB+αH), (αB+αS) and (αB+αT) indicate the conditional mean WTP for H, S and T, respectively. 
The first game effects variable (Playit) is a ‘play’ dummy variable that is 1 if the farmer’s bid in the 
practice season immediately preceding the high-stakes season of treatment t  was such that he 
purchased the seed (i.e., his bid was greater than or equal to the randomly drawn seed cost) and 
received an uncertain payoff. The second game effect variable (Earnit) captures the farmer’s earnings 
in the immediately-preceding season.  
                                                 
8 Recall that there are two high-stakes bids for B and one high-stake bid for H, S, and T elicited from each farmer.     
  19
In expected utility parlance, the conditional mean WTP estimates – αB, (αB+αH), (αB+αS), and 
(αB+αT) for B, H, S, and T, respectively – represent the corresponding mean certainty equivalents.
9 
Furthermore, the mean risk premium is approximately the difference between the EV and WTP for 
these distributions and can be computed as RPB=50-αB, RPH=80-(αB+αH), RPS=50-(αB+αS), and 
RPT=65-(αB+αT), respectively. The joint null hypothesis that tests for risk neutrality based on EV is 
therefore: 
H10:    αB=50=EVB H1A:    αB<50      [joint EV risk neutrality] 
  αS=0=∆EVS     αS>0 
αH=30=∆EVH    αH<30     
  αT=15=∆EVT   αT<15    
 
where ∆EVt=EVt-EVB.  
  Stochastic dominance detection is an important heuristic in the process of decision making 
under uncertainty (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
10 Dominance detection can be tested easily with 
this specification. Based on the first-order stochastic dominance (>FSD) relationships T>FSDB, 
T>FSDS, and H>FSDB, the following joint hypothesis tests for the detection of FSD: 
  H 2 0:  αT=0   H2A:  αT>0     [FSD detection] 
αT=αS     αT>αS 
αH=0     αH>0 
The hypothesis that tests for lower variance valuation simultaneously tests for detection of weak 
second-order stochastic dominance:  
H30:  αS=0   H3A:  αS>0    [lower variance valuation] 
which tests whether farmers are willing to pay a premium for a decrease in variance that is isolated 
from a change in EV.  
  The second and third specifications that focus on treatment effects differ only in their 
dependent variable: 
                                                 
9 Since the experimental distributions are over Rupee payoffs, this is true provided second order effects involving u’(.) 
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where ∆ indicates farmer i’s incremental willingness-to-pay for distribution t. In order to infer a 
farmer’s valuation of changes in a yield distribution, we must assess how much more the farmer is 
willing to pay for one distribution over another. The experiment instructions deliberately cast 
distribution B as the benchmark distribution and H, S and T as modifications of this benchmark, 
making the relevant increment the difference between a farmer’s bid for B and his bid for H, S and 
T. Thus, ∆WTPit=WTPit-avg[WTPiB] and ∆wtpit=∆WTPit/avg[WTPiB].
11 Using ∆WTPit  and  ∆wtpit 
instead of WTPit  as the dependent variable properly focuses the analysis on farmer-specific, 
incremental valuation of changes in yield distributions.  
  The estimated constant in these specifications represents the mean ∆WTP or ∆wtp for S. 
Thus, (δS+δH) and (δS˚+ δH˚) represent the mean ∆WTP and ∆wtp for H, and (δS+δT) and (δS˚+ δT˚) 
represent the mean ∆WTP and ∆wtp for T. Hypotheses for testing risk neutrality and dominance 
detection with these specifications are simple extensions of H1 and H2 above. Hypotheses for 
testing variance and skewness valuation are also natural extensions of H3 and H4 but merit explicit 
statements: 
  H 3 0′:  δS=0   H3A′:   δS>0   [∆ valuation due to lower var.] 
  H 3 0′′:  δS°=0   H3A′′:   δS°>0   [%∆ valuation due to lower var.]   
  In estimating these three treatment effect models, I assume that the variance of the 
disturbance term, σεi
2, may be different for each farmer i. That is, the estimation of these models 
imposes homoscedasticity within farmers but allows for heteroscedasticity between farmers. In 
general, allowing for heteroscedasticity between farmers is appealing for the same reasons farmer 
                                                                                                                                                             
10 Dominance heuristics are especially important in the ‘editing stage’ of the decision-making process in which an 
individual simplifies the problem he faces (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).     
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fixed-effects are appealing. To illustrate more specifically why different farmers likely have different 
σεi
2, consider some farmers’ tendency to bid in Rs5 increments. Though the experiment imposed no 
restrictions on farmers’ bids, about one third of the farmers bid exclusively in Rs5 increments (i.e., 
Rs35, 40, 45, etc.), one third bid mostly in Rs5 increments, and one third – undeterred by the 
‘roundness’ of Rs5 increments – bid in increments of Rs1. Because his bids are more discretized, a 
farmer who bids exclusively in Rs5 increments almost surely has a larger σεi
2 than one who bids in 
Rs1 increments.
12 White (1980) standard errors are thus computed throughout to allow for between, 
but not within, farmer heteroscedasticity.    
  Table 2 displays estimation results for these treatment effect models with farmer-fixed 
effects and standard errors corrected for within-farmer heteroscedasticity. The top panel displays 
results for all farmers. The bottom panel displays results for farmers who understood the 
experiment, which excludes the 16% who reported they had understood the experiment ‘with some 
confusion,’ ‘poorly’ or ‘very poorly.’ At the 10% level (one-sided), we reject the joint null of risk 
neutrality based on EV (H1) for all farmers and for those who understood. We also easily reject the 
null of FSD detection (H2) for both samples. Farmers clearly detected the obvious dominance 
relationships T>FSDB, T>FSDS, and H>FSDB. Based on the coefficients on S, the test of lower 
variance valuation (H3) indicates that farmers’ valuation of lower variance appears to be zero on 
average. This confirms statistically what is true graphically in Figure 4: the demand curves for S and 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 Recall that in the experiment, farmers bid on B, then on the other distributions (in four different orderings), then 
again on B. Averaging farmers’ initial high-stakes bid for B with their final high-stakes bid for B controls for changes in 
farmers’ valuation of B that might have occurred as their understanding increases over the course of the experiment. 
12 An analog exists in domestic labor surveys: workers who report working 38 hours per week are generally reporting 
hours worked more accurately than those who report 40 hours per week, many of whom actually worked a few hours 
more or less than 40 hours. Whether this pull comes from a general preference for such increments (anecdotally, 
pricing in farmers’ markets in the study site is often in Rs5 increments) or from the experiment itself, which specified 
all payoffs at even Rs10 increments, its presence is clear.     
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B are indistinguishable. The risk premia in Table 2 are averages implied by the estimated mean WTP 
for each distribution.
13 
The results for the ∆WTP model indicate a failure to reject H3′. Indeed, whether all farmers 
or only farmers who understood are included δS is negative, implying that farmers actually pay less for 
the lower variance of S. That is, they seem to value the lower downside risk less than the potential 
upside gain they sacrifice to get it. Results from the ∆wtp model support this finding.  
 
Moment Effects Model:  The model that isolates farmers’ valuation of the first three moments of 
payoff distributions is:   
01 2 it EV t SD t Sk t it it i it WTP EV SD Sk Play Earn u α αα α α α ε =+ + + + + + + 
where EV is expected value, SD  is standard deviation, Sk  is skewness (a dummy variable for 
distribution T), ui  is a farmer random effect, and εit  is an error term distributed N(0,σε
2). This 
specification directly tests farmers’ valuation of the first three moments of the payoff distribution. 
The hypothesis that tests farmers’ valuation of higher skewness is simply:  
H40: αSk=0     H4A: αSk>0     [higher skewness valuation] 
As above, I estimate two additional moment effects models to capture farmers’ incremental 
valuation of moments of the payoff distributions.  
01
01
it EV t SD t Sk t it i it
it EV t SD t Sk t it i it
WTP EV SD Sk Earn u
wtp EV SD Sk Earn u
α αα α α ε
α αα α α ε
∆= + + + + + +
∆= + + + + + +
 
To identify the coefficients on the moment variables in these specifications, I must include the L 
distribution (because the B distribution is excluded in the estimation of these incremental 
                                                 
13 Farmers’ maximum WTP for each payoff distribution is defined as u(w)=Eu(w+y-WTP) where w is wealth and y is 
the yield payoff. The risk premium (RP) is defined as RP=Ey-CE, where CE is the certainty equivalent defined as 
u(w+CE)=Eu(w+y). As long as second order effects in the function u(.) are relatively small WTP≈CE and RP≈Ey-
WTP.     
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specifications). To allow comparisons between these two specifications and the total WTP 
specification, I estimate the WTP model first excluding then including the L distribution.  
Estimation results for these moment-effects models are shown in Table 3. On average, 
farmers value Rs1 of EV at Rs0.44, but value neither lower variance nor higher skewness. This result 
is confirmed for both total and incremental valuation and is robust to the inclusion of all farmers or 
only those who understood the experiment well.   
 
Wealth and Risk Exposure Indices:  The third set of models focus on farmer characteristics and 
require wealth and risk exposure indices, which I discuss and estimate in this subsection. The wealth 
index is the product of a vector of farmer wealth variables (wi) and a vector of corresponding 
weights (γW). The risk exposure index is analogously the product of a vector of farmer risk exposure 
variables (ri) and a vector of corresponding weights (γR). These scalar indices of farmer wealth and 












To estimate γW and γR, I use factor analysis so that the data determine the weights.
14 The results of 
this estimation approach are shown in Table 4.   
The asset variables used in the wealth index include acres of non-irrigated land, Tropical 
Livestock Units (TLU, includes bullocks, cows and goats with weights 1, 1 and 0.1, respectively), 
television ownership, and ownership of a house with a concrete floor. Total expenses includes the 
total annual expenses (Rs) on clothes, education, electronics, and medicine and is meant to capture 
expenses that vary significantly across households according to wealth, rather than a complete 
                                                 
14 I follow an iterative approach for selecting the variables included in wi  and ri. Beginning with a broad set of 
variables, I estimate an initial weight vector and compute a residual correlation matrix. When off-diagonal residual 
correlation is greater than 0.10 between two variables, I retain the variable that seems to be more relevant or more 
reliable and remove the other, then re-estimate the weight vector using this more focused variable vector. See Lawley     
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accounting of household expenses. The coefficients and means shown in Table 4 suggest that total 
expenses and acres of non-irrigated land contribute the most to the average farmer’s wealth index. 
Table 4 also shows hypotheses that test the existence of a common factor and whether more than 
one is needed.
15 Given the variables included in the wealth index, these tests suggest there is clearly a 
single common factor.  
Wealth is generally a well-defined – if imperfectly measured – characteristic that researchers 
can reasonably hope to approximate with a scalar index. Capturing a farmer’s or farm household’s 
exposure to risk, on the other hand, poses an admittedly greater challenge. Others have computed 
related measures of vulnerability and risk exposure. Maxwell (1996) and Maxwell et al. (1999) 
construct a food insecurity index based on the frequency and severity of a household’s responses to 
food shortages. Thus computed, the index captures the household’s vulnerability to fluctuations in 
its food supplies. Mosely (2003), who also uses an experimental approach, constructs an index of 
‘perceived vulnerability’ based inter alia on an individual’s memory and expectation of poverty to 
capture individual’s attitude towards risk.  
The risk exposure index I compute aims to capture exposure primarily to agricultural 
production risk. The index is based on the recent income and crop fluctuations experienced by 
farmers, their own perceptions about the riskiness of their income sources, and their ability to 
insulate themselves from drought through access to irrigation. The survey asked farmers to recall the 
worst farming season they had experienced in the last five years and to describe the causes and 
consequences of this particular season, including which crop was most severely affected. The first 
variable in the risk index indicates the percent of this crop that was lost in this particular season. The 
survey also asked farmers to list their three most important productive activities and how much of 
their total income came from each activity. The second and third variables, respectively, indicate the 
                                                                                                                                                             
and Maxwell (1971) for details about factor analysis. See Sahn et al. (1999) and Lybbert et al. (2002) for applications 
of factor analysis that involve asset and wealth indices similar to those constructed in this section.     
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percent of a farmer’s total income that comes from what he perceives to be ‘very risky’ and ‘no risk’ 
sources. The fourth variable is acres of irrigated land owned by the farmer.  
The results in Table 4 suggest that the percent income from ‘very risky’ sources contributes 
the most to the average farmer’s risk exposure index. Percent income from ‘no risk’ sources and 
total irrigated land reduce a farmer’s risk exposure. Surprisingly, the percent crop lost in the worst 
season in five years also reduces a farmer’s current risk exposure, suggesting either that the variable 
is measured with error or that farmers who were hard hit in a recent bad season have since altered 
their productive strategies to reduce their exposure. Hypothesis tests again confirm that there exists 
a single common factor.  
The left panel of Figure 5 displays kernel density plots of the wealth and risk exposure 
indices.
16 The right panel of Figure 5 displays a scatter plot of the two indices with a kernel density 
regression line of the wealth index on the risk exposure index.
 17 These two indices are clearly 
uncorrelated (correlation coefficient -0.06). 
 
Farmer Effects Models:  With wealth and risk exposure indices in hand, I now discuss and estimate 
farmer effects models. These farmer effects model seek to understand differences between farmers 
in their valuation of seed traits. Do farmers with different characteristics value higher moments of 
yield distributions differently? This set of models seeks to shed some light on this question, which 
has important implications for the likely valuation and uptake of pro-poor seeds that confer 
primarily higher moment benefits. These models share the form: 
   () ijt 1i Ni i ijt WTP f , x ,  ,x , ,  ,  u ε =+ + tt t i i t j mm m z g v …  
where mt is again a vector of the first three moments of payoff distributions (i.e., EV, standard 
deviation, skewness), x1i,…,xNi are scalar farmer characteristics so that xnimt is a vector of farmer-
                                                                                                                                                             
15 These tests are possible because the coefficients were estimated using maximum likelihood.      
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moment interaction variables, zi is a vector of (un-interacted) farmer characteristics, git is again a 
vector of game effect variables, vj  is a vector of village dummies, ui is a farmer random effect, and εit 
is an error term distributed N(0,σε
2). Instead of fixed- or random-effects, farmer effects are now 
modeled explicitly using farmer-specific variables. Consider the following specification: 
0
1234 5
ijt i i i i
iii i t i t i i t
WTP Wealth Risk Bt MisUnd
IrrL Edu Age Play Earn u
β
ββββ β ε
′′ ′ ′ ′ =+ + + + +
′ ++ ++ + + + +
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where Wealthi is the wealth index for farmer i, Riski is the risk exposure index,
18 Bti is a dummy 
variable that is 1 if farmer i  has adopted Bt cotton and 0 otherwise, MisUndi  is 1 if farmer i 
understood the experiment with ‘some confusion,’ ‘poorly’ or ‘very poorly’ and 0 otherwise, IrrLi is 
acres of irrigated land cultivated, Edui  is years of education, Agei  is age in years, and all other 
variables are as defined above. Coefficient vectors (e.g., β
t) are indicated in bold.  
As before, I estimate two additional specifications of this model – ∆WTP and ∆wtp – that 
focus on farmers’ incremental valuation. I estimate both of these specifications with the L 
distribution included. Again, I estimate the WTP specification first excluding then including the L 
distribution to ensure comparability. Table 5 displays the estimation results for these three 
specifications. Consistent with the previous results, farmers appear to value only expected value and 
not lower variance or higher skewness. Wealthy farmers appear to value lower variance less than 
poor farmers. The magnitude of this wealth effect for H is even higher in the ∆WTP and ∆wtp 
models. Wealth does not appear to affect farmers’ valuation of skewness, which remains statistically 
zero.  
The only risk exposure variable that is close to statistical significance at the 10% level is the 
skewness interaction variable (p-values are 0.13, 0.11, 0.26 for the WTP, ∆WTP, and ∆wtp models, 
                                                                                                                                                             
16 Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidths of 0.18 and 0.17, respectively. 
17 Logistic kernel with bandwidth of 0.13.     
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respectively).
19 Thus, there is weak evidence that farmers exposed to greater risks value a reduction 
in downside risk more than those exposed to less risk. The mean of the highest (lowest) quintile of 
the risk index is 0.76 (-0.79). Thus, the (Risk x Skew) coefficient in the ∆WTP model (p=0.11) 
implies a difference in the incremental valuation of the highest and lowest quintiles of about Rs4.5.  
Bt cotton farmers appear to value lower variance slightly more than other farmers, although 
these effects are not strongly significant. Farmers who indicated they understood the experiment 
with ‘some confusion,’ ‘poorly’ or ‘very poorly’ seem to value EV substantially and significantly less 
than those who understood the experiment well. These misunderstand variables are meant, however, 
to control for farmers’ valuation, rather than explain it.  
Overall, these results suggest that, relative to wealthy farmers, poor farmers do not appear to 
value higher skewness of a distribution, but may value lower variance. The imprecision of the 
estimates, however, makes this evidence weak at best. Generally, while farmers are clearly not 
identical in their valuation of these experimental distributions, there are no clear patterns that 
connect farmer traits to valuation. These results reinforce the conclusion from the treatment effects 
models that farmers are more responsive to changes in EV than in variance or skewness. 
   
6  DISCUSSION  
One of the objectives of this paper is to explore the use of an experimental methodology in 
empirical development economics. While the presentation of this paper’s motivation, the 
experimental design and the analysis of the experimental data have helped to explore this 
methodology, the objective requires a more explicit discussion of the limitations of the experiment 
used in this paper. Some of these are general limitations to experimental economics. Others are 
                                                                                                                                                             
18 While the risk exposure index possibly introduces an endogeneity problem, there are no good instruments available 
for this index. This problem, which admittedly may bias the estimation results, arises because a farmer who chooses 
risky activities as his income sources may bid more for a risky payoff.     
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design-dependent and might be remedied through modifications in the experiment – albeit often at 
the cost of new limitations. This section discusses some of these limitations of the experiment used 
in this paper and highlights a few of these design tradeoffs. Any practical implications of the results 
in this paper should be informed by an understanding of these limitations. 
As mentioned, a major challenge in designing the experiment was striking an appropriate 
balance between context and abstractness. The experiment was situated clearly in a farm context, but 
payoff distributions were kept abstract. Keeping the distribution independent from any particular 
seed or seed trait has the advantage of focusing farmers’ attention on general yield risk. This 
abstraction, however, ignores more qualitative features of farmers’ risk preferences. For example, 
would farmers have responded differently if they were told the truncation in a yield distribution was 
due to pest-resistance or drought-tolerance? Farmers might be notably more risk averse under the 
specific (and feared) threat of pests or drought. Ignoring these qualitative dimensions to risk 
perception might produce underestimates of farmers’ valuation of pest-resistant or drought-tolerant 
seeds. On the other hand, formally introducing qualitative features of yield risk may also complicate 
the experiment and confuse farmers. Further research is needed to assess the relative importance of 
farmers’ perceptions and valuation of qualitative yield risk.  
Another limitation due to abstraction relates to how farmers make farm-level decisions 
about seeds and other productive and managerial inputs. In practice, these decisions are iterative and 
collective. Farmers generally interact extensively with other farmers, agro-services dealers and family 
members as they formulate their input purchasing decisions. In this experiment, farmers made 
valuation decisions individually and privately. The experiment did, however, offer farmers several 
practice rounds with each payoff distribution. So, while the design included some iteration in the 
decision process, it did not allow for consultation with others.  
                                                                                                                                                             
19 Keep in mind, however, that the estimated risk exposure coefficients are potentially biased due to the possible 
endogeneity of the risk index.     
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Next, the design of the experiment used in this paper may suit cash crop farmers, but may be 
inappropriate for subsistence farmers. Since this limitation stems from the use of monetary payoffs, 
a modified experiment involving in-kind payoffs might make the experiment amenable to 
subsistence farmers. With such a modification, it is possible that these farmers, for whom 
subsistence thresholds may be particularly threatening, would display markedly different risk 
preferences and would value risk-reducing seeds quite differently than cash crop farmers. While this 
may be an important general concern, most of the farmers in this experiment grow cash crops.  
Another possible limitation is that relatively wealthy farmers may not have treated the 
experiment as seriously as their poorer neighbors. A farmer’s total expected payoff was intentionally 
designed to be higher than the daily wage rate for unskilled labor – a considerable amount for a poor 
farmer, but obviously less substantial for a wealthy one. Still, in experimental economics, even small 
payoffs can provide substantial incentives to participants (Davis and Holt 1993). Given the setting 
of the experiment, a more likely problem with wealthy farmers is that they may not be all that 
different from poor farmers. Even wealthy farmers are only wealthy relative to other farmers in their 
village and are in fact poor relative to wealthy farmers in other Indian states may help to explain why 
relative wealth does not significantly influence farmers’ WTP.  
A deeper limitation of using experiments to elicit farmers’ valuation of risk-reducing seeds is 
that the researcher cannot ethically expose farmers to substantial risks such as crop failure due to 
pests. The experiment conducted in this project was designed so that farmers might lose a few 
Rupees in a particular round but would always leave the experiment with positive net earnings. 
While this is an ethical necessity, it is also an important limitation to any study of downside risk 
preferences. Farmers’ valuation of the higher moments of a payoff distribution would surely be 
more effectively elicited by an experiment that offers farmers gambles with the risk of substantial 
loses. Of course, such experiments are ethically inappropriate. Small short-term loses in an 
experiment are generally permissible only if subjects’ total net earnings are positive. Such a guarantee     
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of net gain may introduce moral hazard problems that lead farmers to unrealistic behavior. After all, 
an experiment that lacks substantial risk of loss can hardly simulate the kinds of livelihood risks that 
farmers in poor countries often face. As a possible remedy, a modified experiment could frame 
short-term loses within a round such that they are perceived as more significant longer-term loses.  
Ultimately, the relevant question here is whether farmers’ decisions in the experiment 
differed systematically from decisions they would make on the farm. Answering this question will 
require additional research into the use of economic experiments among farmers in developing 
countries. The growing body of research using field experiments in developing countries (see 
Cardenas and Carpenter 2004) offers encouragement for such research. The present experiment 
contributes to this encouragement. The limitations above represent what I think are this 
experiment’s most serious limitations. Conspicuously missing from this list is farmer confusion. 
Based on pre-testing of the experiment, farmer practice with the experiment, farmers’ self-
assessments, and informal follow-up discussion with farmers, I am confident that most farmers 
understood the experiment remarkable well. That this is true for farmers with little or no formal 
education and despite a relatively complex experimental design is encouraging. In particular, this 
suggests that even relatively involved experimental designs that allow for iterative learning and open-
ended valuation questions may be viable options for researchers working among those with little or 
no formal education. If this degree of comprehension is possible in other settings, several 
challenging and policy-relevant research questions might be addressed in the future through 
experimental methods. 
 
7  CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis of this paper suggests that farmers are generally more responsive to changes in the 
expected value (EV) of a yield distribution than in the higher moments of the distribution. The     
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farmers surveyed appear to value neither lower variance nor higher skewness even though both are 
presumably favorable for any risk-averse farmer. There are some loose patterns in farmers’ 
valuation. For example, wealthy farmers appear to value increases in EV, but poor farmers may 
value a decrease in variance more than the wealthy. Likewise, farmers who consider their sources of 
income to be quite risky value seem to value higher skewness in a payoff distribution, which implies 
lower downside risk, more than other farmers. But these findings are statistically weak and the 
results do not yield any strong conclusions about the effect of farmers’ traits on their valuation of 
yield distribution properties. This suggests that farmers’ constraint sets (e.g., access to credit and 
inputs) may determine their adoption of pro-poor seeds that reduce risk more than their risk 
preference-based valuation of these seeds (Binswanger 1980). 
These results have implications for the development and delivery of pro-poor seeds that 
reduce yield risk. If farmers do not value a lower variance or higher skewness in a crop yield 
distribution, then seeds with stabilized or truncated yield distributions must be marketed based on 
other traits. Not surprisingly, the best trait breeders could include to sell a seed would be higher 
expected yield. In the end, the development and delivery of pro-poor seeds that reduce risk must be 
informed by farmers’ valuation of quantitative yield risk, as explored in this paper, and qualitative 
dimensions of yield risk and threats such as drought and pests. A comprehensive assessment of 
farmers’ valuation of risk-reducing seeds is necessary because adoption patterns might be distinctly 
different for such seeds given that the benefit of these seeds is stochastic and may be particularly 
difficult for farmers to discern. These benefits from these pro-poor seeds may also extend beyond 
farmers. For example, consumers facing poorly integrated food markets may benefit from risk-
reducing seeds since, in such cases, yield distributions offen shape the distribution of food prices.  
As with any experiment, the one used in this paper has a variety of limitations. Although the 
experiment was set in a farming context, it could not fully capture the richness of farmers’ actual 
seed selection and valuation decisions. Consequently, farmers’ valuation of payoff distributions in     
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the experiment may only partially represent their valuation of crop yield distributions. Despite these 
limitations, the experiment encouragingly suggests that farmers with little or no formal education 
can comprehend experiments that allow for iterative learning through repeated rounds and elicit 
valuation through open-ended questions using standard laboratory techniques. This raises the 
possibility of using experimental economics to address a variety of other policy-relevant questions in 
development economics.  
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Figure 1 Intertemporal utility with yield pdf superimposed to illustrate the pro-poor benefit of 
















Figure 2 Map of surveyed villages in Salem and Perambalur districts of Tamil Nadu (TN), India 
(India map courtesy of www.theodora.com/maps, used with permission).     
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Figure 3 Marginal probability distributions (top) and cumulative probability 
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Figure 5 Non-parametric regressions of wealth index and risk exposure index 
densities (left) and scatter plot of wealth and risk exposure indices (right).     
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics for relevant variables 
Median Mean Std.Dev Max Min # Min
HH size 4 4.24 1.17 7 2
Female {0,1} 0.01 0 287
Age 45 43.64 11.39 77 19
Education (yrs) 5 4.82 4.52 20 0 105





Total annual expenses (Rs)† 6,500 11,490 14,416 118,000 0 2
Tropical livestock units 2 1.80 1.66 10 0 66
Land (acres) 5 6.67 5.60 50 0 1
% irrigated land 25% 33% 36% 100% 0 115
% in cotton 24% 28% 29% 100% 0 88
% in maize 50% 46% 33% 100% 0 65
% in chilies 0% 2% 6% 67% 0 254
% in paddy 0% 8% 14% 100% 0 184
Increase yield  1 1.3 0.7
Stabilize yield 4 4.1 1.3
Protect against crop loses 3 2.7 1.1
Lower production costs 3 3.6 1.4
Increase harvest quality 4 4.2 1.2
Efficiently use water 6 5.0 1.5
% income from 'very risky' sources 40 36 33 100 0 109
% ... from 'no risk' sources 0 6 18 100 0 244
% ... exposed to high weather risk 40 39 35 100 0 104
% …exposed to high market risk 30 35 37 100 0 129
% …exposed to high pest risk 40 37 31 100 0 89
Average [Base (B)]‡ 44 45 12 85 14.5
H i g h  ( H ) 6 0 5 81 79 92 0
Stabilized (S) 45 44 13 95 10
Truncated (T) 50 51 15 99 10
Total earnings from experiment (Rs) 63 64 11 135 44
† Includes expenses on clothes, education, medicine/health, and electronics.
‡ The average of the two high-stakes seasons for B.
Household Demographics, Wealth & Assets
Farm Management Goals (rank)
Risk Exposure of Productive Income
High-Stakes WTP in Experiment
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Table 2 Estimation results for treatment effect models with farmer fixed-effects and standard 
errors corrected for between-farmer heteroscedasticity. 
Model:
Coeff. Std.Err. Rs rp=RP/EV Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
Constant
† 43.9 ** 1.34 6 12% -2.8 * 1.4 -2.1 3.7
Higher (H)  13.2 ** 0.9 23 29% 13.4 ** 0.9 31.4 ** 2.5
Stabilized (S) -0.40 0.85 7 13%
Truncated (T)  6.3 ** 0.84 15 23% 6.5 ** 0.9 14.6 ** 2.2
Previous Play {0,1} -0.30 0.81





† 44.3 ** 1.5 6 11% -3.6 * 1.6 -2.3 3.8
Higher (H)  13.3 ** 0.94 22 28% 14.0 ** 1.0 33.3 ** 2.5
Stabilized (S) -1.0 0.94 7 13%
Truncated (T)  6.4 ** 0.93 14 22% 7.2 ** 1.0 16.7 ** 2.3
Previous Play {0,1} -0.5 0.90




†Constant is Base (B) in WTP and S in ∆WTP and ∆wtp. 
* indicates significance at 10% level
** indicates significance at 1% level






∆WTP over B (Rs) WTP (Rs)
Risk Premium (RP)
∆wtp over B (%)
732
====  Farmers who understood experiment well 
‡  ====
====  All Farmers  ====
0.38 0.40 0.34
870
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Table 3 Estimation results for moment effects models with farmer random-effects.  
Model:
L distribution:
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
Constant 22.6 ** 2.5 21.2 ** 2.3 -26.2 ** 2.3 -56.0 ** 5.8
EV 0.44 ** 0.032 0.45 ** 0.019 0.44 ** 0.019 1.07 ** 0.049
St.Dev 0.0170 0.055 -0.0020 0.050 -0.018 0.054 -0.072 0.14
Skewness 0.02 1.17 -0.32 1.10 -0.41 1.09 -1.82 2.78
Previous Play {0,1} -1.9 * 0.86 -1.6 * 0.75
Previous Earnings 0.012 0.015 0.027 * 0.013 0.067 * 0.017 0.13 * 0.042
N =
Constant 21.5 ** 2.8 20.0 ** 2.6 -25.4 ** 2.2 -52.1 ** 5.4
EV 0.44 ** 0.035 0.47 ** 0.021 0.46 ** 0.019 1.10 ** 0.047
St.Dev 0.0510 0.061 0.0204 0.055 0.002 0.050 -0.142 0.12
Skewness 0.62 1.30 0.10 1.22 -0.28 1.10 -1.51 2.75
Previous Play {0,1} -2.3 * 0.94 -2.2 ** 0.83
Previous Earnings 0.009 0.016 0.021 0.015 0.035 ** 0.012 0.07 * 0.029
N =
* indicates significance at 10% level










====  All Farmers  ====
====  Farmers who understood experiment well  ====
∆WTP (Rs) ∆wtp (%)
976
Excluded    
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Table 4 Factor analysis results for wealth and risk exposure indices 
Variable Std. Coeff. Mean Std.Dev. Hypotheses df ChiSq Pr>ChiSq
Ln(Non-Irr.Land) 0.33 1.4 0.79 H0: No common factors 10 40.7 < 0.0001
Ln(TLU) 0.19 0.84 0.60 HA: At least one factor
Television {0,1} 0.53 0.33 0.47 H0: One factor is sufficient 5 3.6 0.61
Concrete floor {0,1} 0.23 0.87 0.34 HA: More factors needed
Ln(Total Expenses) 0.42 8.8 1.2
% Crop Lost -0.12 63 20 H0: No common factors 6 17.9 0.006
% Income from 'Very Risky' source 0.40 35 33 HA: At least one factor
% Income from 'No Risk' source -0.31 6.2 18 H0: One factor is sufficient 2 2.8 0.23
Ln(Irr.Land) -0.10 0.85 0.80 HA: More factors needed
† Motorcycle {0,1} and Radio {0,1} (Tractor {0,1}) were removed after iteration one (two) to reduce multicollinearity.
‡ Log TLU (% Income in 'worst' season) were removed after iteration one (two) to reduce multicollinearity.
========== Risk Exposure Index ‡ ==========
Hypothesis Tests




Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
Constant
† 17.3 ** 4.2 17.8 ** 4.0 -34.5 ** 4.2 -65.0 ** 10.4
EV 0.49 ** 0.045 0.46 ** 0.026 0.45 ** 0.026 1.1 ** 0.067
St.Dev 0.034 0.079 0.053 0.071 0.073 0.077 0.094 0.20
Skewness -0.88 1.7 -0.56 1.6 -0.72 1.6 -2.7 4.0
Wealth -6.7 * 3.5 -4.6 3.3 -5.8 * 3.4 -12.8 8.6
   Wealth x EV 0.092 * 0.049 0.028 0.028 0.026 0.027 0.070 0.070
   Wealth x St.Dev 0.05 0.085 0.11 0.077 0.16 * 0.083 0.34 * 0.21
   Wealth x Skew 0.0 1.8 1.0 1.7 1.0 1.7 2.9 4.3
Risk Exposure -1.9 4.0 -3.2 3.8 -1.4 3.9 7.5 9.8
   Risk x EV -0.032 0.055 0.021 0.032 0.020 0.031 -0.018 0.080
   Risk x St.Dev 0.065 0.096 0.019 0.087 -0.028 0.094 -0.25 0.24
   Risk x Skew 3.61 * 2.0 2.87 1.9 3.0 1.9 5.5 4.9
Bt Cotton {0,1} 7.9 * 4.7 4.0 4.4 3.7 4.5 3.1 11.4
   Bt Cotton x EV -0.125 * 0.065 0.008 0.037 0.009 0.037 -0.010 0.094
   Bt Cotton x St.Dev 0.034 0.11 -0.082 0.10 -0.20 * 0.111 -0.29 0.28
   Bt Cotton x Skew 3.25 2.4 1.29 2.3 1.4 2.2 4.8 5.7
Misunderstand {0,1} 5.4 6.4 8.4 6.0 9.2 6.1 28.4 * 15.5
  Misund x EV 0.01 0.1 -0.10 * 0.1 -0.10 * 0.050 -0.22 * 0.13
  Misund x St.Dev -0.20 0.2 -0.11 0.1 0.002 0.151 -0.20 0.38
  Misund x Skew -3.82 3.3 -2.21 3.1 -2.1 3.0 -8.7 7.7
Ln(Irr.Land) -0.14 0.77 -0.32 0.74 0.02 0.84 -1.4 2.0
Education -0.05 0.14 -0.05 0.13 -0.09 0.15 -0.32 0.36
Age 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.13 0.06 0.13 0.13
Previous Play {0,1} -1.8 * 0.87 -1.5 * 0.76
Previous Earn 0.01 0.01 0.03 * 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.14 0.04
N=
†Village fixed-effects results are suppressed. 
* indicates significance at 10% level






∆wtp (%) ∆WTP (Rs) WTP (Rs)
1160 1160
Included
 
 